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FOREWORD 
This report was produced in accordance with NASA Contract NAS 8-25098 
under the technical management of Lee Malone and in consultation with 
Donald Stone, NASA Astrionics Laboratory, George C. Marshall 
Space Flight Center, Alabama. It defines RF and Seismic techniques for 
detecting hazards to a Lunar Roving Vehicle in accordance with Exhibit A 
of the contract. 
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1 - SUMMARY 
This report contains the results of a study to define a system capable of detecting 
potential -hazards to a lunar roving vehicle and preventing it from moving into a position which 
will prevent continuation of the mission. The study consisted of the following: 
" 	 A literature search of all pertinent areas and subjects to determine that any 
concept under consideration had not already been evaluated. 
" 	 Determination of sensor or combination of sensors to identify potential hazards. 
Techniques were limited to radio frequency wave propagation above or through 
the lunar surface and seismic wave propagation through the lunar surface. 
Pulse and FM-CW radars were investigated as candidates for a surface 
hazard detection system. - Preliminary choices of system parameters such as 
antenna configurations, beam width, depression angle and transmitting ­
frequency were made. Analyses of errors inherent to the system and those 
contributed by the lunar terrain were made and approaches offered for mini­
mizing these errors. 
Seismic techniques and soil penetrating radar were investigated. Approaches 
and shortcomings of applying these techniques to a subsurface hazard detection 
system were analyzed. 
" 	 The basic information derived from the sensor investigations were used to 
determine the physical and performance impact on the LRV capability. Consid­
erations were given to weight, power, space, mounting configurations, and 
ancillary equipment to support the hazard detection system. 
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2 - INTRODUCTION 
Surface mobility is a fundamental requirement for continued lunar exploration 
beyond the initial Apollo landings. A lunar roving vehicle (LRV) will provide mobility for 
astronauts and will have the capability for performing long-range geological and geophysical 
traverses by remote control from the earth. In the remote control mode it will have a 
range of at least 1000 Kn and a possible operational life of one year. Limitations will be 
imposed on the monitor and controller on earth due to TV bandwidth, limited field of view, 
absence of sound and motion cues, adverse lighting, communication disturbances, and the 
2.6 second (minimum) communications time delay. Thus, it will be necessary to have a 
hazard detection and avoidance system aboard the LRV to prevent mission failure. 
For the purpose of study the following surface discontinuities were defined as 
hazards:
 
* 	 Surface holes having a diameter (horizontal measurement) greater than one 
meter and a depth greater than one meter. 
" 	 Rocks having a width (horizontal dimension) greater than one meter and/or a 
height (local vertical dimension) greater than one meter. 
* 	 Cracks or fractures in the surface, if they are wider or longer and in either 
case deeper than one meter. 
* Surface crusts, concealing holes, too thin to support the weight of the IRV. 
At the onset of the study NASA recommended that the investigation consider the 
space, weight andpower guidelines established by Grumman's LRV project for a hazard 
detection system. These guidelines were established to be: 
* 	 Space less than 1 ft 3 
* 	 Weight less than 10 pounds 
* 	 Powei less than 10 watts 
The discussion that follows begins with the results of a literature search of 
various concepts and techniques for hazard detection. This is followed by a section devoted 
to RF techniques for surface hazard detection. Seismic techniques and soil penetrating 
radar approaches to sub-surface hazard dete6tion are then discussed. Finally, the impact 
that the proposed systems would have on the LRV is presented. 
In addition to the main technical discussion, recommendations are made for 
further investigations in this area. Appendix A has been included to provide detailed 
analyses of errors effecting the RF approach to a hazard detection system. 
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3 - CONCLUSIONS 
Surface hazards to the LRV cmn b6 detected by the candidate FM-CW radar 
system. The candidate system will meet the range and resolution requirements of the 
unmanned mission of the LRV for the majority of the lunar terrain expected to be traversed 
by the LRV. Errors due to certain lunar terrain configurations will produce false alarm 
rates, however compensation can be provided to minimize these errors. 
Increases in space, weight and power beyond the present guidelines would be 
necessary to meet range and resolution requirements for speeds higher than the unmanned 
mode. In addition, the utilization of beamwidths in the order of one degree would be 
necessary to meet the resolution requirements. 
At present sub-surface hazards exist only in theory.. Analysis of recent lunar 
seismic data may provide evidence to support this theory. It will be extremely difficult to 
provide accurate advanced warning of sub-surface hazards. The seismic and soil penetrat­
ing radar techniques presented in this report offer approaches to this detection problem. 
However, the present state-of-the-art of these techniques requires the use of equipment 
whose size and weight would be extremely difficult to implement aboard a lunar roving 
vehicle. It is concluded that if sub-surface hazards continue to be matter of concern, 
research should be extended in these areas so that a practical system capable of being 
installed on the LRV might be developed. 
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4 - LITERATURE SEARCH
 
4.1 SOURCES
 
The main sources utilized were: NASA, Scientific and Technical Aerospace 
Reports (STAR), Defense Documentation Center, Technical Abstract Bulletins (TAB); 
International Aerospace Abstracts (IAA), and Government and industry publications located 
in Grumman's Engineering Library. 
Computer print-out literature searches in the area of short-range radars and 
seismic detectors were received from NASA Scientific and Technical Information Facility. 
Pertinent information in the areas of RF and seismic detectors was received from equipment 
manufacturers via vendor conferences, catalogues and technical reports. Additional seismic 
information was obtained from the National Speleological Society Library. 
4.2 LISTING OF REPORTS 
All pertinent reports perused during the literature search are listed in this report. 
Those reports used as sources for the study analysis are listed in the reference section. 
Those reports which contain pertinent information but which were not directly used to support 
the analysis are listed in the bibliography section. 
4.3 CONCLUSION ON STATE-OF-THE-ART FROM LITERATURE SEARCH 
In the extensive literature search conducted by Grumman no RF or seismic 
system was found which could meet all of the hazard detection requirements of the lunar 
roving vehicle. 
Numerous systems exist in the RF area which offer approaches for an RF hazard 
detection system. The most promising systems exist in the field of radar altimeters. A 
considerable part of the study effort was devoted to this approach and the findings are 
discussed in the section on RF sensors. 
The literature on seismic sensors is devoted mainly to detection by passive means. 
Reports on active seismic schemes are devoted mainly to systems containing numerous 
arrays, large base lines and long-term detection analyses. However, some techniques 
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reported offer approaches which might be utilized to warn the LRV of sub-surface hazards. 
These approaches are discussed in the section on Seismic sensors. 
The literature search also located many reports concerned with soil analysis and 
measurement of sub-surface stratification-features utilizing RF techniques. Soil penetrating 
radar offers another approach to the detection of sub-surface hazards to the LRY. This 
approach is discussed in the section on soil penetrating radar: 
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5.1 
5 - SURFACE HAZARD DETECTION
 
RF TECHNIQUES 
This section of the report is devoted to RF techniques and the feasibility of 
adapting them to a hazard detection system for a lunar roving vehicle. The hazards of con­
cern to the vehicle in this section are surface hazards and are defined as follows: 
" 	 Surface holes having a diameter (horizontal measurement) of one meter or 
larger and depth of at least one meter 
" 	 Rocks having a width (horizontal dimension) greater than one meter and 
height (local vertical dimension) greater than one meter. 
These formations are considered negotiable limits to the LRV configuration used 
as the baseline for this study when the vehicle is travelling in the remote control or un­
manned mode. The maximum vehicle speed in this mode is 2krh/hr. In addition to the 
surface hazards defined above, power constraints on the baseline configuration set limits on 
slopes that the vehicle can negotiate. Thus, positive or negative slopes greater than 350 
are also considered surface hazards. 
The minimum detection distance requirement depends upon the type and slope of 
the terrain, the braking capability of the vehicle and the response time of the detection 
system. Consideration has been given to this requirement and is discussed further in the 
report. 
For the purpose of clarity the investigation of RF techniques for surface hazard 
detection is presented in the following manner. Those parameters which are common to all 
techniques are presented first. Next, various candidate RF techniques are discussed and 
the most promising candidate selected. 
In the application of RF techniques to a hazard detection system for a lunar 
roving vehicle numerous sources of error arise. These include discernment of slopes, 
effects of pitch and roll, lunar terrain roughness, change of slope, and inherent radar 
errors. The detailed discussion of these parameters has been included in Appendix A. 
Where applicable, the results of these analyses have been included in this section of the 
report. 
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5.1.1 Antenna Location 
The LRV configuration used as the baselifie for the study is shown in figure 1. 
In this configuration a mast structure has been provided for the TV camera and is also used 
for mounting the RF antenna. The mast is located on the centerline of the vehicle and 1.25 
meters behind the wheelfront. The antenna is located as high as possible on the mast to 
increase the depression angle of the radar beam and to provide greater back scattering co­
efficient. It also has the advantage of an increase in the line of sight. Constraints imposed 
by freerspace-loss, wave-guide plumbing losses, and increased errors due to pitch and roll, 
limit the height at the antennas to three meters above the terrain. 
A minimum detection distance of 1.75 meters in advance of the wheelfront is 
required to enable the discernment of positive slopes of 350 or more (see Appendix A-i). 
This implies an antenna depression angle of 450 (see Fig. 2). 
5.1.2 Antenna Beamwidth 
The same antenna will be used for the detection of both holes (negative obstacles) 
and rocks (positive obstacles). The radar system employedmeasures slant range to.the 
terrain, so that the range reading increases when a negative obstacle is detected and 
decreases when a positive obstacle is detected. To improve the capability of detecting 
any obstacle and for greater resolution in measuring range to the obstacle, it is desirable 
to keep the beamwidth smaller than the width of the obstacle. Narrower beamwidths 
will improve the gain and resolution, however, the size of the antenna will increase 
accordingly. Furthermore, too narrow a beamwidth may result in an increase in noise due 
to insufficient terrain averaging. A 5' elevation beamwidth will illuminate an approximate 
longitudinal distance of 1/2 meter (3 db points) centered about 1.75 meters in advance of 
the wheelfront (see Fig. 2). A 7.50 azimuth beamwidth provides approximately 1/2 
meter transverse coverage. 
5.1.3 Transmitter Frequency 
The transmitter frequency determines the antenna size aiter the beamwidth has 
been selected. Higher frequencies reduce the size and weight of the antenna-as well as that 
of the RF receiver and transmitter components. The highest frequency which should be 
used is limited by the reliability and availability of components, the available RF power 
output, and the lunar surface back scatter coefficient. This limit is reached in K-band 
between 15 and 30 Ghz. Operational solid state altimeters are available at 18 Ghz which 
weigh less than 4 pounds and uses less than 6 watts input power for 2000 ft. ranges at 
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normal incidence (ref. 6). The final choice of frequency would be determined by a detailed 
study of hardware availability. A preliminary choice of 25 Ghz with a 50 x 7.5* beamwidth 
establishes the antenna size of 6.7" by 4.5". 
5.1.4 . Antenna Scanning 
In order to obtain a margin of safety during maneuvering it is desirable to provide 
transverse coverage at least one and three quarters feet wider than the vehicle or a mini­
mum of 146 inches (3.7 meters). To provide antenna coverage over the transverse range 
required will make an antenna scanning system a necessity. Two possible choices are: 
" 	 Multiple sampled fixed beam antennas with sequential processing for minimum 
hardware weight. 
* 	 Servo driven pencil beam antennas. 
5.1.4.1 Multiple Sampled Fixed Beam Antennas 
Using 7.50 azimuth beamwidth antennas, a total of six overlapping beams are 
required to provide the transverse coverage (Fig. 3). A single transmitter and receiver 
will be used to economize on hardware, weight and power requirements. The six antennas 
will be sampled with a switch. Diode switching of both the transmitter and receiver is 
feasible. Using an FM-CW system, separate receive and transmit antennas with a high 
degree of isolation are required for each beam. A pulsed carrier system would use a 
single antenna per beam for both transmission and reception. As shown in Appendix A-1, 
the information rate from each antenna must be at least one sample every half second or a 
maximum of every 1/4 meter of vehicle travel. A switching speed of 2 cycles per second 
will meet this requirement. Switching may be accomplished using diodes in shunt or in 
series with the antenna feeds. Since radar types such as FM-CW require separate transmit 
and receive antennas, they would require a total of 12 antennas and 12 switching diodes. 
Each receive antenna would be located approximately a foot below its associated transmit 
antenna in order to provide adequate isolation (Ref. 1). 
5.1.4.2 Servo Driven Antenna 
The servo driven antenna has many disadvantages such as: 
" 	 Requirement for long-life, high-vacuum bearings. 
* 	 Requirement for shielding against lunar dust. 
* 	 Increased power required for servo drives. 
11
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* 	 Relatively low, long-term reliability for rotary components. 
* 	 Inability to increase reliability by the'use of redundancy with respect to the 
mechanical components. 
Its 	major advantage is that it requires only a single antenna or pair of antennas. 
Based on the above considerations, a diode switched array of antennas has been 
tentatively selected as a preferred scanning system. 
5.1.5 	 Radiated Power Requirements 
The required power can be calculated by use of the following standard radar 
equations: 
(4 R4)S PR L 
pT 
 2 2 
8.2G 
OE OH 
Ac 0 = (ROE) (ROH) 
00 
where: PT = Transmitter average power (milliwatts) 
PR = Receiver returned average-power (milliwatts) 
R = Slant range (meters) 
G = Antenna gain 
a0 = Radar backscatter cross-section (square meters) 
OE = Antenna elevation plane beamwidth (radians) 
OH = Antenna azimuth plane beamwidth (radians) 
A = Illuminated area (square meters) 
L Microwave transmission losses 
= RF wavelength (meters)
 
The assumed parameters are:
 
R = 4.25 meters
 
= .012 meters (for 25 Ghz)
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0 E = . 087 radians (50) 
= .131 radians (7.50) 
= 10 3 (-30 db) 
L = 4 (6 db) 
PR = 10 - 9 milliwatts (-90 dbm) 
a 	 is based on the measured Surveyor and Apollo data shown inFigure4 (Ref. 2). 
Since this data was based on large patch sizes and was taken at X-band and 
Ku-band, it was modified by adding a 12 db safety factor to the measured 
This 12 db allows for small patch size lunar terrain variability and represents 
a safety factor to cover the uncertainty involved. 
PR is based on the use of a receiver with an effective noise bandwidth of 0.5 Mhz, 
a noise figure of 12 db and a minimum discernible signal (MDS) of -90 dbm. 
Substituting these values into the power equation, the minimum required trans­
mitter average power is found: 
(47)3 (4.25)4 (4) 10 - 9 
= 
[(.o'<. 31)]2-8)(.131)j [012] 2 [(4.25)2 (.087) (.131) i1j 
pT 	 0.17 milliwatts 
The use of a 10 milliwatt transmitter average power would provide a margin of approxi­
mately 18 db. This would allow for an operating S/N of 12 db and a 6 db margin for aging 
and environmental effects. 
5.1.6 	 Radar Candidate Systems 
Before discussing particular radar systems, it should be mentioned that the 
principles discussed previously have been general and will be applicable to all of the 
following radar system. 
5.1.6.1 	 The FM-CW Candidate System 
This system operates on the principle of the radar altimeter by transmitting 
an FM signal (using either sawtooth or sinusoidal modulation) and measuring the beat 
frequency between the transmitted and received signals. This frequency is proportional 
14
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to the range. Figure 5 is a block diagram of an FM-CW radar. For reference, some of 
the electrical values are: 
Transmitter freq. = 25 ghz; IF freq. = 30 Mhz; IF amp. bandwidth= 0.5 MVlhz; 
transmitter average output power = 10 MW; receiver sensitivity (MDS) = -90 dbm; 
receiver noise figure = 12 db. 
The beat frequency fB is given by: 
4Rf Af 
B C 
where R = slant range; C = velocity of light; fmn is the modulation frequency; and A f 
is the frequency deviation. 
For R = 4.25 meters; fm=200hz; and Af=l135mhz 
fB = -1530 hz 
A source of error arises in systems utilizing cycle counting for frequency 
measurement. This error is called the quantizing or "fixed step error" which is due to the 
fact that the frequencr counter will only count integral cycles of the beat frequency in the 
period 1/fI. This fixed step error is given by 
R =s i246 
where 6 R Is in feet and a f is in mhz. For example, for Af = 135 mhz, then 
R = 1.82 feet (.555 meters). 
This fixed step error is too large, particularly in the detection of slopes. For 
example, for the detection of a positive slope of 35, a range decrease of only 0.582 meters 
is sensed over an interval of travel of 1.0 meters, (Appendix A-i). It is thus evident that 
the fixed step error would have to be significantly reduced. It can be seen in the Appendix 
(Section A-3) that in order to avoid too many false alarms it is desirable to keep the overall 
RMS error of the system (this includes terrain, roll, pitch, and. radar errors) down to 
the order of 0.1 meter if possible. Thus, the radar is budgeted to an RMS error of .053 
meters. It can be seen, therefore, that even if terrain averaging were relied on to reduce 
the fixed step error by one half (Reference 4), the fixed step error would still have to be no 
more than 0.1 meters, and - F would have to be at least 740 mhz. This value and its 
associated linearity requirements, is probably beyond reach with present day solid state 
devices (though easily achievable with backward wave oscillators). Therefore, the use of a 
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non-counting (continuous) frequency meter such as a frequency discriminator must be 
examined. The discriminator output is a voltage proportional to frequency and is continuous 
rather than discrete. Discriminator circuits have not been popular in the past, in FM 
altimeter systems, since stability and linearity problems have been experienced, particu­
larly over a wide range of frequency operation (Reference 3). 
However, discriminator circuits would be appropriate in this application. The 
slant range coverage will only be from about 2.75 meters to 7.0 meters or a beat frequency 
ratio of about 2.5 to 1. This is very small compared to the beat frequency ratios normally 
used in altimeters. In addition, only the slant range in the region from 3.25 meters to 5.25 
meters, or a frequency ratio of 1.61 to 1, will require extra care with regards to linearity 
and stability. Thus, the discriminator response must be particularly linear and stable only 
over a 1.61 to 1 beat frequency ratio. The beat frequencies would be transposed to a higher 
center frequency so as to substantially decrease the bandwidth requirements. Typically, a 
very stable 35 khz oscillator would be chosen and heterodyned with the beat frequency which 
is in the range of about 1 to 2.5 khz (see Figure 5). The output of the low frequency ampli­
fier would be heterodyned with the 35 khz oscillator and the output fed into a band pass 
filter. This filter will pass only the upper sidebands, 36 to 37.5 khz, and reject the lower 
sidebands 34 to 32.5 khz by at least 20 db. The band pass filter output would be fed to a 
limiter whose output goes to the discriminator. The discriminator may consist of a three 
pole Butterworth filter centered at 35 khz and having a bandpass of 34 to 36 khz. 36 khz, 
representing the I khz beat frequency (slant range of 2.75 meters) will be the 3 db down 
point of the filter, and 37.5 khz, representing the 2.5 khz beat frequency (slant range of 
7.0 meters) will be 14.6 db down on the skirt (see Reference 5). The slant range of 3.25 
meters will represent about 3.8 db down on the filter skirt and the slant range of 5.25 
meters will represent about 9.8 db down on the skirt. Over this range, the filter response 
vs frequency is extremely linear, representing less than 0.2 db (<2%) excursion from 
linearity. The output from the discriminator will be in volts, representing the slant range. 
It is, of course, evident that amplitude and frequency stability will be very essential. A 
self-test mode is provided whereby a calibration frequency is fed into the discriminator 
through the limiter to check its output voltage. This voltage should remain constant (or be 
compensated for) within 1 to 2% at the calibration frequency. The output of the limiter 
will have to be constant to within about 0.3 db or 3% over the range of voltage amplitudes 
fed into it. Both the IF and LF amplifiers will require good automatic gain control to, 
minimizd the range of voltage amplitude fed into the limiter. 
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The use of a frequency discriminator offers one mechanization technique that 
could be used in FM-CW systems that would eliminate cycle counting for frequency 
measurement. The use of techniques of this type would eliminate the inherent fixed step 
error and would make budgeting of a radar RMS error of .053 meters plausible in an FM-CW 
system. 
5.1.6.2 The Ultra Short Pulse Candidate System 
This system is a pulsed radar system using extremely narrow pulse widths. 
Time delay of the pulse return is a measure of target range. For example, a target at a 
1 meter range represents a 6.6 nanosecond time delay. As-was mentioned in the previous 
section, it is necessary that the RMS range error be less than .053 meters. Thus, time 
delay should be measured to an accuracy better than .35 nanoseconds. Therefore, if a 3 
nanosecond pulse width is used, its time delay measurement must be accurate to better 
than 12% of the pulse width. 
Figure 6 gives a diagram of a simplified pulse radar. For reference, some 
typical electrical values are: Transmitted frequency= 25 ghz; pulsewidth = 3 nanosec.; 
IF = 1500 mhz; IF bandwidth = 330 mhz; local oso. = 23.5 ghz; receiver sensitivity (MDS) = 
-75 dbm: receiver noise figure = 12 db. For comparison purposes with the FM-CW 
radar, the pulse radar requires a transmitted peak power of 315 W to obtain a S/N ratio of 
18 db per pulse. 
5.1.6.3 The Pulse Leading Edge System 
This system measures range by tracking the leading edge of the return pulse. 
That is, it measures the range to the closest part of the particular hazard. 
Short pulses are required. However, since the leading edge is tracked, the pulse 
width need not be quite as narrow as for the previous case. Pulsewidths of 10 nanoseconds 
should be sufficient, but the leading edge rise time should be no more than 0.35 nano­
seconds. The r.f. peak power requirements for this radar will be a little less than for the 
ultra short pulse system due to the fact that the minimum bandwidth requirements are a bit 
less. The block diagram of the. leading edge tracker is essentially the same as for the 
ultra short pulse radar, figure 6, with minor modifications. The leading edge tracker will 
probably require both a transmit and receive antenna due to the increased pulse width. -
Thus, referring to Figure 6, the TR device will be eliminated and the transmitter 
will be connected directly to the transmit antenna, while a receive antenna will be connected 
to the mixer. The gating, timer, and threshold circuitry will be optimized to respond to'the 
leading edge of the return pulse. 
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5. 1. 6.4 The Ultra Short System Using Range Gating 
This system employs a pulse system, uses a broader beamwidth in elevation (to 
illuminate more of the terrain in the longitudinal direction) and measures range by range 
gating the receiver. For example, using an elevation beamwidth, B , of about 18', (the 
beam may be shaped, to give a csc 'P/'E F return so that each range cell on the 
ground will provide equal returns) and a depression angle, "4 , of approximately 40 ° , a dis­
tance of about 2.3 meters on the ground, would be illuminated longitudinally, starting at a 
distance of about 1. 3 meters preceding the wheelfront, and ending at a distance of 3. 6 
meters from the wheelfront. This longitudinal length may then be divided into five range 
cells by using five receiver range gates. Returns from each particular cell will in turn be 
sampled. Detector thresholds (which may be varied, depending on terrain type, pitch, 
roll, etc.) will be established for each range cell, based upon expected return .from flat 
terrain. A strong return in a particular gate would then indicate a positive obstacle at 
that range, while a normal return in a particular range cell would indicate normal terrain 
at that range. A weak return would indicate a negative obstacle at that particular range. 
Since the slant range to the point that is 3.6 meters in front of the vehicle is 1. 76 meters 
(11.6 nanoseconds) longer than that to the point 1. 3 meters in front of the wheelfront, each 
range gate may be about 2.3 nanoseconds in width. The block diagram of the ultra short 
pulse radar, Figure 6, may be used with some modifications. 
The sawtooth timer will trigger five gates rather than one as shown, with a total 
time delay of 4 r between the gates. Each gate width, T , will be 2.3 nanoseconds wide. 
The first gate responds only to the return from the range cell that is 1.3 meters in front of " 
the vehicle, (assuming flat terrain), and the fifth gate responds only to signals that are 
delayed in time by an amount equivalent to the return from the range cell that is 3.6 meters 
in front of the vehicle. 
The video amplifier will also feed into the gates and the five outputs from the 
gates will represent the returns from the five range cells. The transmitted pulse width 
will be 4 nanoseconds, for this case. 
5.1.6.5 	 Comparison of Candidate Systems 
The following table compares the candidate systems. 
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Radar System Advantages 
FM-CW Relative simplicity and low 
power required for short 
range detection 
Used in majority of altim-
eter applications 
All-solid-state systems 
are within state-of-the-
art 
Ultra short 
pulse 
Its narrow pulses provide 
greater ranging accuracy 
and finer resolution 
One antenna can perform 
both the transmit and 
receive functions 
Pulse Leading Range is measured to 
Edge Tracker closest part of obstacle 
Technique avoids pulse 
stretching produced by 
multipath reflections 
Extremely narrow pulse 
widths are not required 
Disadvantages 
Elimination of inherent step 
error requires a stable and 
linear frequency discrimina­
tor 
Separate receive and trans­
mit antennas required 
Average range to target 
rather than range to closest. 
part of target is measured 
Short pulse systems require 
extremely precise elec­
tronics, high voltage sup­
plies, and larger bandwidths 
which result in heavier and 
more complex systems 
Average range to target 
rather than range to closest 
part of target is measured 
All-solid-state systems are 
not within the near state-of­
the-art 
Leading edge technique 
requires pulses with ex­
tremely-sharp rise times 
Holes will not be detected if 
any part of beam reflects 
from a surface above the 
hole 
Separate receive and trans­
mit antennas required 
System complexity and 
weight greater than FM-CW 
system 
All-Solid-State systems are 
not within the near state-of­
the-art 
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Radar System Advantages Disadvantages 
Ultra Short Range gates provide good Technique requires the use of 
Pulse Using range resolution a relatively broad elevation 
Range.Gating beamwidth. This can give 
Technique provides time rise to ambiguity and multi­
history of terrain as path problems 
vehicle advances. Thus, 
terrain returns are Complexity and weight will 
averaged, be at least as great as ultra 
One antenna can perform 
short pulse system. 
both the transmit and 
receive functions. 
5.1.6.6 	 Choice Of ACandidate System 
The previous discussion has not shown any one system to be vastly superior to all 
others. However, the FM-CW system has been recommended, since it is basically less 
complex, lighter, and more naturally suited to short ranges. It is also considered to have 
the least development time. Proven solid-state oscillator multiplier techniques provide 
suitable transmitter power and modulation characteristics at 18 ghz (Ref. 6) to perform 
FM-CW altimetry. By increasing the fundamental frequency 4 to 5% a system operating at 
25 ghz can be obtained. No well-established solid-state sources of suitable pulse power are 
available to support a pulse mechanization. 
Before leaving the discussion on the radars it should be mentioned that G.A.C. 
has been supporting an in-house laboratory effort to investigate a radar to measure short 
ranges. 
Components for a breadboard model of a very simple FM-CW radar were 
assembled utilizing standard test equipment. The transmitter consisted of an Alfred micro­
wave sweeper operating at X-band. An electronic frequency counter was utilized to measure 
the beat frequency. Tests were conducted under controlled conditions to calibrate the beat 
frequency with range to target. Preliminary field tests were then initiated. The equipment 
was assembled on a mobile cart and antennas mounted so that the slant range to the level 
ground intercept point was approximately four and one half feet. The tests were conducted 
in an open field utilizing a ditch two feet wide by two feet deep as a target. As the equip­
ment was moved slowly toward the ditch a discrete change in slant.range from four and one 
half to six and one half feet, as denoted by the frequency counter, was detected when the 
beam entered the ditch. These encouraging results showed the feasibility of detecting 
targets of concern at short ranges with FM-CW radar. 
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5.1.7 Power and Weight Estimates for Proposed System 
Power and weight estimates have been based on some proposed and existing radar 
systems operating in Ku and Ka band. Estimates given by vendors of conversion efficiency 
(DC to RF) have varied from 0.7% (FM-CW altimeter operating at K band - Reference 6) to 
0.18% for the overall efficiency of the LM landing radar. Using, therefore, 0.2% as a 
conservative estimate for the efficiency, the DC input power requirement would be 5 watts, 
based on 10 MW of RF output power. Adding to this, the bias power requirements of the 
twelve switching diodes, which is estimated to be of the order of 1 watt, the overall input 
requirement would be less than 6 watts. Weight estimates given by some vendors have 
varied from 1.2 lbs for a Ku band aircraft altimeter to 4 lbs for a Doppler radar operating 
in K band. 
a 
Conservatively, using 4 lbs. for the weight of the radar, plus 2 lbs for the weight 
of twelve antennas, and another 1.5 lbs for the support of the antennas, brings the total 
weight to about 7.5 lbs. The volume is estimated to be less than 100 cubic inches. 
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6 - SUB-SURFACE HAZARD DETECTION 
The detection of voids beneath the lunar surface is important where the roof of 
the void is too thin to support the weight of the LRV. 
Seismometry provides atechnique of detecting voids with a reasonable false alarm rate 
and acceptable weight, cost and electrical power demand. A number of seismic methods are 
used on earth for various geophysical purposes. Probably the best known and most easily 
understood methods are those using passive instruments to detect seismic disturbances 
generated external to the system. The classical use of these methods is detecting distant 
earthquakes. More recent uses include detection of nuclear explosions and intruders 
(ranging from foot steps to heavy vehicles). However, since the voids that the LRV is to 
avoid are believed to be quiescent, active seismic methods are necessary. 
Active seismometry involves a source of seismic energy and one or more 
sensors. In normal geophysical use explosives are used as seismic sources and geophones 
are used as sensors, converting the received seismic energy to electronic signals that can 
be amplified, processed and displayed (Ref. 7). Typically, a string of geophones is buried 
(or at least the spikes driven into the ground) along a straight line. The explosive is buried 
at some distance beyond one end of the line, see Figure 7. Where the successively 
deeper rock formations have increasing seismic velocities, significant amounts of energy 
will be refracted to travel along each of the discontinuities. The depth to each discontinuity 
can be determined by measuring the arrival times at each of the geophones. If, in such a 
geologic structure a void existed along one of the discontinuities, as shown in Figure 8, 
several different phenomena could be used to detect it. These include an additional delay, 
increased attenuation and oscillation or ringing of the walls of the void. The refraction 
configuration has the disadvantage of such a widespread of geophones and source as to be 
impracticable from a moving vehicle. Closer spacing of source and geophones is used 
occasionally for reflection seismic shots, as shown in Figure 9. Presence of a void, as 
shown in Figure 10, could be detected on the basis of an additional reflection, shadowing 
of known reflections (from deeper layers) (Ref. 8) by increased delay or attenuation, and 
oscillation of the walls of the void. 
While all of the phenomena mentioned above have been used to detect the presence 
of subterranean voids, each has its own advantages, disavantages and limitations (Ref. 7, 9, 
10, 11, 12). All phenomena unique to refraction techniques are impracticable for use with 
the LRV due to the spacing between source and geophones being much larger than the vehicle. 
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To be practicable, all elements of any system should be within, or at least fairly near, the 
perimeter of the vehicle. Increases in delay and attenuation can be caused by many 
different geological structures in addition to the voids that could be hazardous to the LRV. 
Such geological structures as thin cracks (of the order of a centimeter wide) and interfaces 
between different types of rock and materials can include numerous interfaces similar to 
shale. These discontinuities can also return echoes in a reflection configuration. These 
geological formations can also cause shadowing of known echoes. On the other hand, 
oscillations of the walls of a void are only known or expected in large voids of the type that 
are expected on the moon (Ref. 13). All other phenomena that have been tried on earth 
suffer from many signals similar to those from voids resulting in a poor signal-to-noise 
ratio and hence causing a poor probability-of-detebtion and/or an excessive false-alarm 
rate (Ref. 14). Thus, the use of a system designed to detect oscillations of the walls of a 
void should provide a significantly higher probability-of-detection and/or lower false-alarm 
rate than any other known seismic type of system. 
The significant difference between the voids that cause oscillations and the forma­
tions that do not is shape. The lava tubes that Watkins (Ref. 13) found to oscillate had cross 
sections that were approximately circular, while the geological structures that pose no 
hazard to the LRV tend to be characterized as thin cracks. However, the significant 
difference is not in the curvature or height-to-width ratio. It is rather the structural 
continuity all the way around the perimeter of the void cross section that appears to be 
important. Thus with a circular cross section, a perturbation can travel-all the way around 
the circumference without significant losses. Cracks, however, tend to extend for relatively 
great distances without a marked end. In addition, where the two sides do join, they are so 
close to being parallel that very little energy can reverse direction to travel around the 
crack. Most limestone caves on earth were originally started by water seeping into stress 
cracks. These cracks usually extend well beyond the cave in both directions. Thus, even if 
this type of cave has a circular cross section, cracks extending out radially will attenuate 
or block wall vibrations that would otherwise travel all the way around. 
The lava tube from which Watkins first observed the wall oscillations had a cross 
section that was not at all circular. It was quite irregular in shape, with the width-to-height 
ratios averaging around four to one (Ref. 13). Watkins extracted from a more theoretical 
paper by Biot (Ref. 15) the following equation for diameter of the lava tube (D) as a function 
of shear velocity (Vs ) of the rock it is in and the frequency (f) of the oscillations: 
D= Vs 
1.55 f. 
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Rearranging, frequency can be computed as a function of diameter and shear velocity. 
f Vs
 
1.55 D. 
However, the original equations all assumed a circular cross section. In this case, the 
actual circumference (C) can be used in lieu of the diameter: 
C= irD 
D= C/7r 
Vs 
f = 2.2 -
C. 
Unfortunately, however, some of Watkins field results gave frequencies as much as three 
times as high as indicated. This was considered due to failure to meet Biot's original 
assumptions of a circular bore in an infinite solid. In each case the ceiling of the cavity was 
close to the surface. Roof thickness was less than the effective diameter. The validity of 
the equations appear questionable, but they still provide the best available method to estimate 
frequeicy as of this writing. If the smallest void of concern is one meter in diameter and 
shear velocity is estimated at 1,000 meters per second (higher than any found by Watkins), 
a maximum expected frequency of about 650 Hertz is computed. Allowing for three times 
that (to be compatible with Watkins) gives an upper frequency of about 2 Kilohertz. Thus, it 
is desirable that the ability to receive and process narrow band signals at least up to 2 
Kilohertz be provided at least in the first operations on the moon. 
So long as the voids of hazardous dimensions on the moon are similar to lava 
tubes, oscillations should be the best means of detection. This is predicated on a volcanic 
history of the moon that included the production of lava tubes, and not including any other 
voids that might be hazardous to the LRV (but are incapable of oscillating). This ideal 
situation, all hazardous voids being of the most easily detected type, can only be confirmed 
with extensive tests on the surface of the moon. First the existence of any voids of 
significant size must be established. Second, the oscillations must be determined. Last, 
the lack of all other voids mast be established over a statistically significant area of the 
moon. The last step comes down to traversing large distances on the moon using detection 
of seismically induced oscillations to avoid lava tubes. If the vehicle does not fall into any 
31
 
voids, the moon can be assumed free of them (at least tentatively assumed). As crude as 
this approach appears, it is probably the only alternative to instrumenting the LRV seismic 
hazard detection system to detect both oscillating and non-oscillating voids. 
The data announced so far from the seismic shock generated by crashing the 
lunar module from Apollo 12 into the moon has been quite interesting, but of little signifi­
cance to the short range seismics intended to be used with the LRV to detect hazardous 
voids. The time periods involved imply transmission over distances and depths vastly 
greater than those needed to detect hazardous voids. However, it would be very helpful if 
the signals received from that shock could be analyzed for oscillations or individual fre­
quency components. If there are voids of the type that can oscillate in significant numbers 
on the moon, the oscillations should have been present in the seismic signals transmitted 
to earth. However, seismologists do not usually look for this type of signal. In addition, 
it is quite possible that due to the nature of the impulsive signal and the multiple paths, 
probably with many reflections, there was a high level of broad band noise that obscured the 
void wall oscillations. 
Detection of oscillating voids could possibly be accomplished with a relatively 
broadband detector, 10 to 2,000 Hertz, for instance (Ref. 13). Data from previous seismic 
tests on the moon would be used to make final determination of the frequency band of interest. 
The upper limit could eventually be reduced when the relationship between void size and 
frequency for the lunar surface meterial is established. Voids less than one meter in 
diameter will oscillate above the optimum upper corner frequency. Lower corner frequency 
will be determined by the largest void detected. 
If the signal-to-noise ratio is not good enough for reliable detection with a reason­
able false-alarm-rate it can be improved by applying signal processing techniques. The most 
likely approach is reduction of bandwidth. With narrower bandwidths less noise andundesired 
signals can reach the detector. The optimum processor gain can be achieved by narrowing 
the bandwidth to that of the signal. Watkins (Rev. 13) reports that the oscillations lasted 
about one second, implying a bandwidth of approximately one Hertz. Thus, by using a de­
tector bandwidth of one Hertz, it will be just wide enough to pass the oscillation from the 
void, but not wide enough to pass any more noise than is necessary. The narrow bandwidth 
detector, however, is not without disadvantages: a time constant that is relatively long (one 
second in this case) and coverage of only the one narrow band, unless the complexity of a 
bank of comb filters or a frequency sweeping system is incorporated into the system. It is 
possible that a compromise bandwidth between ten and one hundred Hertz would provide 
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adequate signal processing gain while keeping the cost, weight and power consumption to a 
minimum. However, the decisions on effective processing bandwidth, upper and lower fre­
quency limits of the band to be processed and type of processing cannot be made until more 
data from the moon becomes available. Of prime importance are the frequencies and the 
signal-to-noise ratios likely to be received. 
Detection of non-oscillating voids would (if desired or needed) call for wide band 
detection. Knowledge of the propagation losses as a function of frequency and the frequency 
characteristics of any echoes would be helpful, however, most systems of this type have 
broad frequency responses with little or no criticality regarding optimum values. Since short 
ranges are involved and good resolution is desired (but not vital), higher than usual seismic 
frequencies appear desirable. It would appear that inclusion of a broad band detector would 
provide little additional complication compared to the signal processing that will probably be 
required for optimum detection of oscillating voids. However, the false alarms that appear 
likely from a broad band detector might very well limit its usefulness. 
All of the preceding discussion has been aimed at merely detecting the presence 
of hazardous voids. Localization, however, is also important so that intelligent decisions 
can be made to avoid traveling over the void. The prime requirement in this case is to be 
able to measure whether the void is to the right or left of the vehicle and approximately at 
what angle. By providing two geophones, one along the right side of the vehicle and one 
along the left, directional information can be derived. Measurement of relative arrival 
times at the two geophones will provide the required information. It should be noted, how­
ever, that the use of arrival times at right and left geophones will not tell whether a given 
signal is in front of or belind the IRV. It can be presumed that as the LRV traverses the 
lunar surface all newly detected voids are initially in front. However, sharp maneuvers 
such as tight turns or backing could complicate decision making. If four geophones were 
used, right and left in front, and, right and left behind, relative arrival times will provide 
enough information to define the spherical angle to the void. Further study is needed, 
however, to determine whether the extra expense, weight and power consumption are 
justified.
 
6-1. SEISMIC SYSTEM 
As has been indicated earlier in this section, merely finding a usable seismic 
phenomenon is not sufficient. A practicable method of generating seismic signals, inserting 
them into the lunar surface and receiving the returning signals is required. Normal seismic 
practice is to bury the explosive charges from 0.1 to 1 meter or more below the surface. 
33
 
Spikes integral with standard geophones are driven into the surface to provide seismic 
coupling. After the required shots the geophones are pulled from the ground and retrieved 
for use on future shots. All of these steps make use with the LRV, which must continue 
moving without unnecessary stops, impracticle. The goal of this study was to investigate 
techniques that would provide seismic detection of hazardous voids while the vehicle moved 
continuously. The only acceptable reasons for causing the LRV to stop is to avoid traveling 
over a void, or, on rare occasion, to wait while a marginal suspicious signal is transmitted 
to earth for analysis and decision. 
The initial problem is to provide some means of coupling between the transducers 
and the lunar surface in a manner that does not interfere with forward motion of the LRV. 
The simplest approach appears to be mounting a number of transducers around the circum­
ference of one or more wheels so that one or more sources and geophones are always in 
contact with the lunar surface. Most designs include wheels that have a relatively large 
segment that is flattened where it is in contact with the surface. Thus, by placing a reason­
able number of units around the tread of a wheel, at least one will always be in contact with 
the ground. Other methods were considered briefly, such as multiple arms that would place 
individual sensors on the lunar surface, hold them in place as the vehicle moved forward, 
then lift and move forward to the next location. This was considered to have complexity 
power and control requirements that placed it well beyond the physical constraints of the LRV. 
If longer periods of time in contact with the lunar surface were judged necessary a system 
utilizing a belt of chain rolling over two wheels, keeping the transducers in contact with the 
ground, could be considered. 
Most mechanical devices teiid to be noisy. Latching vibrations and similar 
functions of the seismic source could easily interfere with geophone operation between 
intended seismic pulses if both source and geophone are mounted on the same wheel. In 
addition, the seismic impulse could easily reverberate through the structure of the wheel; 
around and around the circumference and back and forth along the spokes. In either case 
the reverberations from within the wheel could easily continue long enough to mask returns 
from voids. Therefore, it is quite desirable to use separate wheels for the seismic sources 
and the geophones. In addition to keeping the noise and reverberations of the sources away 
from the sensor wheel and the geophones on it, the noises due to crunching under the vehicle 
weight and due to slippage should also be avoided if optimum detection is to be achieved. 
Thus the sensor wheels should be eparate from the main LRV wheels that carry the vehicle 
weight and are used for propulsion. A possible configuration places the sensor wheels out 
in front of the vehicle so that it will be closer to the voids, providing detection at greater 
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6.2 
ranges in front of the load bearing wheels (that could break through the weak roof of a void). 
The sensor wheels could also be placed along the side of the vehicle, either between the 
front and back drive wheels or outboard of the drive wheels on each side. If field tests 
show that these configurations provide a signal-to-noise ratio significantly better than 
necessary, then it would be worth while to try mounting the geophones on the front wheels 
and the sources on the rear wheels. Due to the shock associated with the impact of the 
seismic source it is desirable that the wheel with the sources cairy enough weight that the 
source can remain in contact with the lunar surface during all portions of-the seismic pulse. 
Noise due to weight and slippage is no problem on the source wheel. Therefbre, it is 
perfectly permissable to mount the seismic sources on one (or more) of the regular LRV 
wheels. 
SEISMIC SOURCE 
In typical seismic practice explosive charges are used as the source. However, 
they have several serious drawbacks when used with the LRV. As expendables used at short 
distance intervals, a large number would be required. If one were used every ten meters of 
travel, a quantity of 100, 000 charges would be needed for a 1,000 kilometer trip. Safety 
requires special handling of explosives. In the required quantities the potential danger is 
extremte should there be an accidental firing. On the other hand, the use of mechanical 
sources eliminates these problems. Two different types of sources are proposed, one 
operated by gravity, the other by compression of a spring. 
The gravity powered hammer seismic source wheel is shown in Figure 11. Three 
spoke-like tubes are mounted within the wheel. Almost any number could be used, but three 
will be assumed until field tests indicate how many seismic pulses are needed for each full 
turn of the wheel. Within each spoke is a steel ball that falls back and forth from one end 
to the other as the wheel turns, acting as a hammer. When it strikes the anvil at the 
bottom end the shock is transferred to the lunar surface, on which it is resting. Apermanent 
magnet next to the anvil holds the hammer in place as the wheel rotates, moving the hammer 
up to the top. When it reaches the top (position 1 in Figure 11), a pulse of current through 
the release coil momentarily cancels the field of the holding magnet, permitting the hammer 
to fall down through the tube (position 2) striking the anvil (position.3). Each hammer in 
each of the other tubes operates in the same way. Each hammer gives two seismic impulses 
for each full turn of the wheel. 
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6.3 
Two possible problems could limit the desirability of the gravity hammer. First, 
the tubes would be relatively sensitive to damage from bending or denting. Either of these 
damages could slow down or stop the hammer. Secondly, the magnetic fields from the 
holding magnets and the release coil could interfere with the magnetic measurements"planned 
to be taken along the moon's surface. 
The alternate type of source utilizes a number of spring-loaded hammers around 
the circumference of the wheel, as shown in Figure 12. Details of the operation of the 
individual hammers are shown in Figure 13. These operate in a manner very similar to the 
automatic center punch used by many machinists and mechanics. While one of the spring­
loaded hammers is at the upper part of the wheel, the spring and shaft are fully extended. 
As the wheel turns, the device is rotated down to where the shaft contacts the lunar surface. 
Further rotation forces the shaft in, compressing the spring. Just before the shaft is­
pushed in all the way, the trigger (shown inside the spring) hits the top of the barrel (center 
portion of Figure 13) and releases the hammer from the shaft. The spring forces the 
hammer down until it strikes the anvil. The impact from the anvil is transmitted to the 
lunar surface by the shaft. If control is desired of the triggering, a magnetic or hydraulic 
device can be used for this purpose. However, the flexibility achieved by controlling 
exactly when a given device triggers is achieved only at the cost of additional complexity 
and computer requirements. In any case, the spring must be damped to prevent vibrations 
interfering with the seismic returns from voids. 
It should be noted that while the two mechanical seismic sources appear to be 
small, cheap and reliable, and require no large amounts of electrical power, the energy to 
operate them actually is taken from the propulsion motors. The raising of the gravity 
hammer and the compression of the spring each require additional power from the propulsion 
motors. The exact amount of energy required will depend upon their final configuration on 
the vehicle. 
CONFIGURATION ON VEHICLE 
One possible configuration is shown in Figure 14. Mechanical sources (spring 
loaded hammers) are mounted on both front propulsion wheels of the LRV. The redundancy. 
is provided only for back up. Control is provided only to allow all hammers on one side or 
the other to operate. The geophones are mounted on two sensor wheels pushed ahead of the 
LRV. The use of two sensor wheels provides redundancy in case of failure on either side 
or seismic anomalies that attenuate the signal to one side. In normal operationmeasurement 
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Figure 12. Spring-Loaded-Hammer Rolling Seismic Source 
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6.4 
of the time difference between arrivals at the geophones on the two wheels provides informa­
tion as to angle of each void with respect to the direction in which it is headed. In addition 
to relative time measurement, signals from each of the sensor wheels is analyzed both for 
narrow band responses (oscillations) and wide band ones. For difficult decisions the vehicle 
stops and sends the questionable signals to earth for detailed analysis and orders for the 
next move. 
SOIL PENETRATING RADAR 
The detection of sub-surface hazards to the LRV may be feasible with the use of 
soil penetrating radar. The present study located numerous articles in the literature 
published by groups investigating the earth sciences and soil trafficability in which the 
feasibility of utilizing RF techniques for the determination of soil parameters was analyzed. 
U.S. Army agencies such as the Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory,
 
(Ref. 16), and the Waterways Experiment Station (Ref. 17), have been conducting soil and ice
 
trafficability studies utilizing remote sensors for the past decade. Numerous companies
 
such as, Texas Instrument, Barringer Research, Adcole, Southwest Research Institute, and
 
General Dynamics Electronics have also performed research in this area, (Ref 18, 19, 20,
 
21, 22).
 
Many techniques for measuring soil thickness were found in the literature. Two of. 
these for which successful field tests have been reported and which offer approaches to the 
LRV sub-surface problem are the Barringer Research RF technique for measuring ice 
thickness (Ref. 20) and the General Dynamics Electronics radar technique for detecting voids 
beneath the surface (Ref. 21). 
The first of these is a VHF Pulse Compression System called the 'chirp' method. 
This technique transmits a broad band signal ranging from 100 to 600 mhz into the surface. 
For a given layer thickness there will be a particular frequency of incident radiation for 
which the layer will be exactly 1/4 wavelength deep. The sub-surface reflection will then 
arrive 1800 out of phase with the surface reflection so that cancellation occurs. The'receiver 
contains many tuned filter circuits, and the filter circuit that corresponds to the layer's 
quarter wavelength thickness will contain minimum energy detectable by minima discrimina-" 
tor. A second sub-surface reflection indicating the bottom of the void can be obtained with 
this technique with the addition of an extra bank of filter circuits and discrimination logic. 
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The second is a time delay method. This technique transmits a short pulse 
approximately 2 nanoseconds long in the 300 mhz range into the surface. Theoretically three 
return signals will be received; one from the surface, one from the top of the void and one 
from the bottom of the void. By comparing the time delay between the received signals, the 
depth to-the top of the void and the bottom of the void can be determined. In an operational 
model the signals are sent to a CRT where visual analysis is performed by an experienced 
operator, however, it is feasible that the system could be made automatic with the proper 
filtering and discrimination logic. 
Soil penetrating radar offers an approach to detection of sub-surface hazards, 
however, there are numerous problems associated with its application to the LRV. The 
frequency which most techniques use is in the UHF-VHF range. The enormous antenna 
sizes associated with lower frequencies and the extremely high soil absorption loss 
associated with higher frequencies led to the selection of this frequency range. Even this 
frequency range requires antenna sizes approximately one meter square of special design to 
give a useable directionallity to the system. 
The power requirements do not appear to be excessive for LRV application. 
Considering a simple power equation: 
PT =PRX+PL+PR+ PS-PAT-PAR 
where: PT = Transmitted Power 
PRX = Received Power 
PL = Two way Path Loss 
PR = Surface Reflection Loss 
PS = Soil Absorption Loss 
PAT = PAR = Antenna Gains 
and using conservative values, the required transmitted power would be: 
PT = -40 + 60 + 10 + 3 - 6 - 6 = 21 dbm
 
or 0.126 watts.
 
If this transmitted power is converted to system power using a conservative 
value of 1. 5%efficiency, an acceptable system power of 8.4 watts would be required. While 
all Values used in the illustrative equation are considered conversative the value of 3 db 
selected for soil absorption loss is worth further discussion. 
This value is based on a theoretical lunar soil absorption loss of 0.5 db/meter and 
a penetration depth of 3 meters. The attenuation may change depending upon the actual 
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characteristics of the lunar soil. At the VHF band and higher the attenuation is mainly 
dependent on the transmitted wavelength, the dielectric constant of the material and the loss 
tangent or dissipation factor of the material. If the three parameters are known the attenu­
ation can be determined from the nomogram in Figure 15 (Ref. 23). The loss tangent is a 
non-linear function of frequency which may peak at more than one value of frequency. 
Dielectric constants and loss tangents of many dielectrics for various frequencies have been 
emperically determined and are listed in the literature (Ref. 23). Applying these values to 
the nomogram of Figure 15, the relationship of attenuation vs frequency for different soil 
types were determined and plotted in Figures 16 and 17. Figure 16 shows this relationship 
for soils with zero moisture content and also for vacuum dried 1/4 inch pumice which 
theoretically resembles lunar soil (Ref. 19). It can be noted that all the materials plotted 
exhibit attenuations less than 1 db/meter at 300 mhz. However, as the frequencies approach 
the microwave region the attenuation losses become prohibitive. The exception to this trend 
appears to be loamy soil. If actual lunar soil is found to exhibit similar characteristics to 
loamy soil then the possibility of utilizing higher frequencies and smaller antennas in this 
technique might be realized. However, surface roughness imposses an additional limitation 
in the use of higher frequencies. Taking the empirical figure of 1/10 of a wavelength as the 
maximum tolerable surface roughness before reflectivities become severly modified by 
surface texture, gives curvatures (partible diameter) of 10 cm at 300 mhz, 3 cm at 1 GHZ 
and 0.3 cm at 10 GHZ. 
Figure 17 shows the attenuation vs frequency relationship for soils with varying 
degrees of moisture content. It is apparent from these plots why transmission to meaningful 
penetration depths in typical earth soils requires excessive amounts of power. 
Another consideration in the use of soil penetrating radar is the incident angle. 
All reported tests were conducted at normal incidence keeping reflection losses and com­
plexities in received signal to a minimum: It is obvious that transmission at off normal 
incidence would cause increased losses in reflected power but more significant is the 
accompanying complexity in the return wave form due to refractions at the interfaces. 
A sub-surface hazard detection system restricted to present state-of-the-art 
techniques would require utilization of a boom which would suspend the antenna or antennas 
two meters in front of the vehicle allowing transmission of signals at normal incidence. 
Any voids detected in the beam coverage less than a threshold depth would cause a stop 
signal to the vehicle. 
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The determination of a value which constitutes a threshold depth will depend upon 
the final vehicle configuration and the overburden that it presents to the lunar surface, and 
the actual cohesive strength of the lunar soil. Since both parameters have not been defined 
to the degree of accuracy required to provide a reasonable assessment of surface layer 
thickness that would constitute a hazard, the assignment of sub-surface hazard threshold 
values would be difficult until such data became available. 
ADDITIONAL TECHNIQUES 
A nunber of "state-of-the-art" geophysical exploration techniques for the detection 
of sub-surface voids have been proven on earth (Ref. 7). Of these methods, the least likely 
lunar candidate is magnetism, due to the paucity of information on the magnetic characteris­
tics of the lunar surface and the very low level of ambient magnetic field of the moon (Ref. 24). 
It is apparent that the magnetic influence of the LRV, especially the drive motors, would 
make detection of weak signals difficult. Due to the lack of information about the magnetic 
structure of the moon it would be impossible to predict either the signature of a void or of 
other formations that might look like a void, but present no danger. (The latter signatures 
would be false alarms.) 
Gravimetry would very likely work, but is impractical in this application. Gravity 
meters have been successfully used to find caves on earth (Refs. 9, 10), however, for each 
measurement the instrument must be placed on the ground, leveled, allowed to stabilize and 
then read by the operator. Since the gravity meter is on the ground, the operator must sit or 
lie down to level and to read it. This would have to be repeated every few meters. Obviously 
the operation of the gravity meter is not compatible with LRV speed or automation require­
ments. 
Measurement of electrical resistivity offers promising possibilities. Initial tests 
on the first samples of lunar surface material returned by Apollo 12 indicate reasonable 
electrical conductivity (Ref. 25). Resistivity measurements have successfully found several 
previously unknown caves on earth (Refs. 11, 12). Three potential significant problems 
would have to be overcome before resistivity could be used for detection of voids from the 
LRV. First, some method of making good electrical contact with the lunar surface must be 
developed. This must have a large surface area of contact so that contact resistance is not 
too large compared with the path resistance. The contact resistance must be fairly constant, 
since variations will appear as noise. Secondly, the presence of the LRVmust not cause 
a significant change inthe measured resistance. Presumably it would be necessary to 
isolate each wheel from the others electrically. Once this has been done, the wheels can be 
used to make the contact for the measurements. The impact of this kind of structural change 
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on the LRV is not known at this writing. Lastly, more must be learned about the electrical 
conductivity of the rest of the lunar surface and down to greater depths. If significantly 
large areas have resistance anomalies, either at the surface or at shallow depths, detection 
of voids will be very difficult. 
Radiometry has also been used on earth over voids (Ref. 26). Normally a cool 
spot indicates a void. Either infrared or microwave wavelengths can be used, however, this 
phenomenon is not well understood and is controversial (Ref. 27). In addition, antennas or 
optical systems are needed with sensing equipment and these systems are expensive, heavy 
and require more than ten watts of power. 
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7.1 
7 - SYSTEM IMPACT ON LRV
 
EFFECT OF SYSTEM ON MISSION REQUIREMENTS 
In discussing the effect of the hazard detection system on mission requirements the 
system has to be considered in two different parts, the surface system and the sub-surface 
system. 
For surface hazard detection a candidate system is FM-CW Radar. The FM-CW 
Radar system as proposed appears feasible and is within the near state-of-the-art. The 
system will provide a range capability of approximately 3 meters and resolution to approxi­
mately 1/2 meter. Thus, it will be capable of detecting surface formations considered haz­
ardous to a vehicle travelling in the unmanned mode. A faster moving vehicle would require 
detection of obstacles further in advance because of the need for increased breaking distance. 
In addition finer resolution would be required since at increased speed, smaller obstacles 
would effect the stability of the vehicle. Since 3 meters approximates the minimum turning 
radius of the vehicle it would be difficult to safely provide an automatic turning capability 
with this hazard detection system, particularly if the obstacle were in the center of the 
vehicle's path. This function would best be left up to the remote operator who after receiving 
an automatic stop signal would maneuver the vehicle and turn it into an obstacle free path. 
This hazard detection system would provide the operator with an indication of the direction of 
the obstacle. 
The constraint of having to stop the vehicle at the detection of every obstacle will 
not appreciably degrade the mission requirement of a 1000km traverse capability. Using 
figures from Grumman's LRV project, the vehicle will have enough driving time to tiaverse 
1155km at an average speed of 1.2km/hr after all times for lunar nights, adverse lighting 
conditions, scheduled stops and battery recharge are deleted from the total mission time. 
This excess of 155km at 1.2km/hr. converts into 160 hours. If a reasonable decision and 
maneuver time of 1/2 minute is assumed each time an obstacle is encountered, a total of 
19, 200 obstacles or one every 50 meters could be encountered before the 1000km mission 
requirement would be degraded. 
Statistical data on lunar formations in the mission areas of concern (Ref. 28) show 
that the distribution frequency of positive obstacles is approximately 1 per 100 meters and 
negative obstacles approximately 3 per 100 meters. From this data it can be concluded that 
the. mission traverse requirement of 1000km would be degraded by as little as 150km if the 
vehicle stopped at every obstacle encountered. However, a realistic assumption is that 
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7.2 
many of the large obstacles encountered would be readily discernable with remote T.V. far 
enough in advance so that avoidance maneuvers could be executed negating the need to stop at 
these obstacles. 
Sub-surface hazards can theoretically be detected by either the seismic or soil 
penetrating radar schemes. The speed of the vehicle would be limited by the amount a boom 
could be extended for the radar scheme and by the geophone wheel noise of the seismic 
scheme. Considering these restraints, the schemes would be limited to the unmanned mode 
of operation. Both schemes as presented would add to the turning radius of the vehicle and 
would decrease the maneuverability of the vehicle. In addition, surface hazard detectors 
would have to be moved forward to protect these mechanisms. 
Both schemes are prone to false alarms because of the difficulty in discerning be­
tween forward range and depth in the seismic scheme and hazard size in the radar scheme. 
Thus, either scheme if utilized would require the vehicle to stop at the detection of any void 
and the operator to maneuver the vehicle into a new direction and try again. In summary, 
the sub-surface hazard schemes would be restricted to the unmanned mode, would increase 
its turning radius and would cause numerous stops if sub-surface voids proved statistically 
high. The effect of these systems on the mission traverse requirement of the LRV can not 
be postulated at this time since data on the distribution frequency of sub-surface voids is 
non-existent. 
COMPATIBILITY OF SYSTEM WITH LRV SPACE, WEIGHT AND POWER 
REQUIREMENTS 
The FM-CW radar scheme was selected because it will meet the space (<l ft), 
weight (< 10 lbs) and power (< 10 watts) guide lines set down by the LRV project and would 
be mounted as shown in Figure 1. If the restriction on power were relaxed then the range 
and resolution could be improved. The range improvement would be realized since the in­
creased power would overcome the increased free space loss and deereased surface reflec­
tion. The resolution improvement would be possible since the increased power could pro­
vide higher antenna gains which along with narrow beams could provide finer resolution. It 
should be pointed out however, that if the space, weight and power requirements were re­
laxed and the future state-of-the-art provided an all solid-state pulse system, the pulse 
system would provide better performance than the FM-CW system. This performance 
advantage would be realized in resolution since the pulse system does not possess the inher­
ent step error of the FM-CW system. 
In the case of sub-surface hazard detection schemes the power guideline can be 
met with soil penetrating radar if the lunar soil losses do not exceed theoretical values and 
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7.3 
can be met with the seismic scheme if signal processing requirements do not prove exces­
sive. The size and weight requirements would be exceeded by both schemes. The radar 
scheme requires large antennas and a boom extension whereas the seismic scheme requires 
extra wheels and coupling to the vehicle (Fig. 14). 
Further studies may provide some improvement in these areas. A determination 
of the highest frequencies which would allow meaningful penetration into the lunar soil would 
provide some reduction in the radar antenna size. The acquisition of reliable reflection data 
at angles other than normal incidence could permit the antenna to be mounted closer to the 
vehicle. In the case of seismic, testing of geophone arrangements and isolation methods may 
provide a scheme where the geophones could be mounted within the envelope of the vehicle. 
ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS 
The discussion on ancillary equipment will be limited to the FM-CW system. The 
block diagram of Figure 18 shows the minimum logic needed for a reliable surface hazard 
detection system. It assumes an array of six sensors each of which will be sequentially 
gated on and off by inputs from the synchronizer. This rate of synchronization can be 
adjusted to vehicle velocity by inputs from an odometer or digital tachometer. Each sensor 
will have its own logic channel. It will not be enough to have a threshold detector which will 
trigger at discrete positive or negative thresholds. Analysis in the study has shown that the 
greatest probability of false alarms will come from negotiable slopes. It does not matter 
how fine a resolution the system has, there will be a point in the vehicle's approach to a 
negotiable slope when the return from that slope will exceed the obstacle threshold. In order 
to overcome this false alarm problem successive readings must be compared to show that 
the change does or does not exceed a threshold rate. A simple circuit regulated by the syn­
chronizer would cause the first return to be clamped in a hold circuit until the receipt of the 
subsequent returns. The subsequent returns would by pass the hold circuit and substract 
from the first return at the output of the hold circuit. These differences over the rate deter­
mined by the synchronizer and the vehicle speed would indicate the change of slope. Thus, if 
the system detected an object whose rate of change in return indicated a non-negotiable 
slope and whose magnitude of return exceeded that of a non-negotiable obstacle an AND gate 
would be triggered sending a brake signal to the vehicle controls. 
The FM-CW system does not offer any automatic turning capability to the control 
system but each channel can be monitored so that the controller will have an indication of 
the direction of the hazard. 
The pitching and rolling of the vehicle will raise the possibility of false alarms. 
The error analysis of the FM-CW system indicated that variations in pitch and roll from 
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1 to 2 degrees would effect the false alarm rate. If the final vehicle configuration shows 
that pitch and roll variations greater than this can be expected then compensation to the 
threshold bias must be added. This compensation could be supplied by vertical sensors 
which have accuracies up to 20 or by sun sensors which have accuracies up to 0. 50 . In addi­
tion to reduction in the false alarm rate the attitude sensors would also provide compensation 
to the rate of change of slope threshold. This would be necessary since if the vehicle was 
already proceeding along a negotiable slope, the threshold for a change in slope would then be 
less than 350 . Attitude sensors such as these are presently being considered for incorpora­
tion into the navigation and control systems of the LRV. Thus, the ancillary equipment re­
quired for the hazard detection system is well within the state-of-the-art and requires a 
minimum of sophistication. 
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8 - RECOMMENDATIONS
 
It is recommended that the RF effort for surface hazard detection be carried into 
a lab and system evaluation stage. In the laboratory phase a determination will be made of 
optimum operating frequencies. These operating frequencies include the transmitting or 
carrier frequency, the modulating frequency and the rate of deviation or sweep Standard 
microwave test equipment will be used to provide various combinations of frequencies. 
Selection of frequencies will be based on those providing the best resolution and minimum 
step error at the ranges of interest with minimum complexity and state-of-the-art equipment 
used as trade-off parameters. Antenna configurations will also be tested in this phase. 
Various sizes and shapes will be evaluated with different frequency combinations. Minimum 
size offering the finest resolution will be the goal of this evaluation. Antenna arrays will be 
evaluated to determine their capability to provide the required resolution and azimuthal 
coverage. Isolation techniques to insure minimum leakage between transmit and receive 
antennas will also be evaluated in this phase. All tests conducted during this phase will be 
performed at controlled target sizes and ranges to insure proper evaluation of the various 
parameters. 
A development model would then be fabricated utilizing available equipment that 
would most closely approximate the characteristics determined in the lab evaluation and 
which would be compatible with the LRV configuration. The development model would be 
mounted aboard Grumman's prototype LRV. System tests would then be conducted at 
Grumman's simulated lunar landscape. The hazard detection system would be evaluated 
under dynamic conditions. Optimum mounting configurations would be selected and a deter­
mination made of the compensation needed for pitch and roll. 
Concurrent with the system evaluation it is recommended that a detailed design of 
the interface logic be formulated. This design would include the gating circuitry, synchro­
nizer, threshold detectors, biasing circuitry, and control and display logic to interface the 
hazard detection sensors with the LRV mobility controls. A development model would be 
fabricated from this design and mounted on the vehicle during system evaluations. Standard 
attitude sensors would be evaluated and modified for incorporation into the hazard detection 
system. Gains and scaling factors would be selected to provide adequate compensation for 
pitch and roll. 
It is recommended that the investigation into sub-surface hazard detection .be 
continued. In the seismic area various seismic signal sources would be fabricated and field 
54
 
tested in conjunction with selected geophone configurations. The tests would be conducted 
over known geophysical formations so that the response to various types of sub-stratifica­
tions can be determined. The results of these tests would be utilized to formulate the type 
of signal processing that would be necessary to incorporate the responses into an automatic 
detection scheme. Concurrent with this phase, seismic results from Apollo 12 and later 
experiments would be monitored. This investigation would provide information as to what 
kind of seismic signals are to be expected and possibly what kinds of voids exist on the moon. 
The Grumman Aerospace Corporation has had extensive experience utilizing various types of 
signal processing to detect weak sine wave type signals in noise. A data reduction center is 
currently in operation in Bethpage studying such signals on a'classified military program. 
The seismic program would also include an investigation of noise isolation 
methods for the geophone sensors. Isolation would be necessary if the geophone sensors 
were to be mounted on the actual driving wheels of the vehicle. 
The goal of the recommended seismic study would be to provide a design of a 
completely automatic seismic detection system capable of being mounted within the envelope 
of the vehicle. 
Further sub-surface hazard detection studies are recommended in the area of soil 
penetrating radar. Investigations would be carried out to determine the maximum trans­
mitting frequency that could be utilized to provide meaningful penetration into the lunar soil. 
This would be correlated with lunar soil cohesion data and data on the overburden which the 
LRV presents to the lunar soil. The results of this phase of the study would be used to 
establish the threshold depth of a sub-surface void that would constitute a hazard and the 
smallest antenna size that could be used to penetrate this depth. 
It is recommended that data on reflections from angles other than normal incidence 
be acquired. This data would be utilized to determine the increased soil reflection loss and 
the processing required to filter the desired signal from the expected complexities in the re­
turn waveform. 
The study would include an investigation of state-of-the-art soil penetrating radars 
to determine how present processing and display techniques could be modified and adapted to 
an automatic hazard detection system. 
The goal of the recommended soil penetrating radar study would be to provide a 
design of a completely automatic soil penetrating radar system capable of being mounted 
within the envelope of the system. 
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A. 1 THRESHOLD LOGIC FOR SLOPES
 
The following section discusses the problems that exist in the detection of slopes 
and the modifications that must be made to the threshold logic to minimize these problems. 
The section is divided into two parts, negative slopes and positive slopes, since each detec­
tion situation will require its own threshold logic considerations. 
Al. 1 	 Negative Slopes 
Figure 19A depicts the vehicle approaching a negative slope of 250 in a simple flat 
terrain and flat slope situation. The range reading will not increase until the beam (Point R) 
reaches the start of the slope, Point 0. As the forward half of the beam (Segment CR) pro­
ceeds down the slope, the range reading will increase only slightly. This is due to the fact 
that the reflection coefficient decreases approximately 1 db per 50 decrease of incidence 
angle (Figure 4). Thus, when the centerline of the beam, Point C, has reached Point 0, 
the relative weight of the return from the forward half of the beam compared with that of the 
total beam is 5 db down from .50 or . i6. Since the forward half of the beam, alone, has 
undergone a .15 meter increase in range, the total range increase is . 15x. 16 meters, or 
about. 024 meters. When the vehicle travels another .25 meters Point L of the beam has 
reached Point 0, and the complete beam is now illuminating the slope (Figure 19B). The 
increase in range per travel distance of. 25 meters is given by: 
QCQM = .25 sina = .25 sin 250 = .308 meters 
Sin (k-a) sin (200) sin 200 
where: 	 (A= depression angle
 
a = slope angle
 
This is equivalentto or 7.25%of reference range. In each subsequent 0.25 of travel 
(on the level terrain) the range reading will increase by .308 meters. (But the amplitude of 
the return will be 5 db down from the reference return due to decreased reflection coeffi­
cient.) When the vehicle has traveled.2.25 meters and the wheelbase is at Point 0 the total 
range increase will be 9x. 308 or 2.77 meters. This will result in an additional 4.34 db 
decrease in return power, making the return power 9. 34 db dowif from the reference return, 
before the vehicle itself enters the slope and the amplitude of the return is increased again. 
This points up the fact that the receiver should respond to signals at least 9. 34 db lower than 
the reference signal. Since the amplitude of the signal return from 350 slopes (which are 
negotiable by the vehicle) will be lower than that for the 250 slopes they will, in all proba­
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bility, be below threshold as the vehicle wheelbase approaches the start of the slope. Thus, 
they will not be detectable by the radar, and will therefore be identified as hazards. 250 
slopes will however be detected by the radar if the receiver will respond to signals that are 
10 db below the returns from level terrain. The slope problem requires that in addition to 
obstacle threshold detection the radar system must include slope measuring logic. 
In the case of negative slopes the logic will be adjusted so that range increases of 
more than 0. 85 meters per 0. 5 meters of travel or less would indicate a hazardous slope. 
(This Value is discussed in Sec. A. 3). A range reading will be taken every 0.25 meters of 
vehicle travel (diode switching rate of 2 cycles per second) and range diffet!ences will be 
measured between the first and two subsequent readings, covering a total travel distance of 
0. 5 meters. The one meter hole represents a special case of a negative slope in which the 
slope angle is 900, but the reflecting surface is the opposite vertical wall (Refer to 
Figure 20). Consider the case when the beam has just reached the edge of the hole, 
(Fig. 20A) i. e. Point R is over the left side of the hole. As the vehicle moves forward 
another 0. 25 meters, the forward half of the beam will be completely inside the hole (Point C, 
the beam centerline, will be over the left side of the hole) and will be reflected back from the 
right side of the hole, while the trailing half of the beam is reflected from the level terrain. 
Under these conditions the return energy from the forward part of the beam may or may not 
be larger than that from the trailing half of the beam, depending on the reflection coefficient 
from the right side of the wall. 
Assume, for example, that the return from the forward half of the beam is 3 db 
less than that from trailing half of the beam. The weighted return from the forward half of 
the beam compared to the return from the total beam is then. 50x. 50 or 1/4 the total weight. 
Since the front half of the beam undergoes about a 1. 30 meter increase in range reading, the 
weighted increase in range is about 1/4xl. 30 meters or . 33 meters, and the hole is not yet 
sensed as a hazard. However, during the next 0. 25 meters of vehicle travel, the trailing 
half of the beam, enters the hole, so that the complete beam has just entered the hole. 
(Figure 20B). Under these conditions the range increase, above the reference or level 
range, is about 1. 10 meters, and the condition is identified as a hazardous slope. It should 
be noted, that although vertical sided walls have been assumed for simplicity, other walls 
making different angles, will not materially affect the analysis presented here. 
The foregoing analysis shows that for a vehicle traversing a flat terrain, dis­
cernment between negotiable negative slopes and non-negotiable negative obstacles or slopes 
can be made for slopes as steep as 250 with the proper implementation of threshold logic. 
Restrictions imposed by line-of-sight will prevent discernment of slopes between 250 and 350. 
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A. 	1.2 Positive Slopes 
The detection of positive slopes is less of a problem than the detection of negative 
slopes, due to the fact that the reflected power increases as the slopes are approached 
(about 1 db increase per 50 of slope). Figure 21A depicts the vehicle approaching a positive 
slope of 350. As shown in the figure the beam (ray R) has just reached the start of the slope, 
Point 0, and the range reading will now decrease as the vehicle travels further. Figure 21B 
shows the situation a short time later when the vehicle has moved 0.50 meters. The decrease 
in range reading is given by: 
QC = QM .50 x sine 0 = .50 x sin 350 = °292 meters. 
sin (qt+a) sin (Q+ao) sin (800) 
( is the depression angle and c is the slope angle). 
Since this decrease is a relatively small amount, the range decrease must be 
measured over a longer distance of vehicle travel. For example, the measured range de­
crease over a 1. 75 meter travel approach to a 350 slope would be 1. 02 meters. The radar 
logic (for positive slopes) will therefore be adjusted so that if the range decrease is more 
than .77 meters per 1. 75 meters of travel or less, the slope is identified as hazardous. 
(This value is discussed in Sec. A. 3). A range reading will be taken every 0.25 meters of 
vehicle travel and range differences will be measured between the first and seven consequent 
readings, covering a total travel distance of 1. 75 meters. 
Allowing therefore, 1. 75 meters of travel to determine whether the slope is nego­
tiable, the vehicle will then have to be halted (after application of braking signal) in a distance 
of 0.25 meters or less. This is within the capability of the vehicle on level terrain. The 
1 meter obstacle hazard represents a special case of a positive slope wherein the slope is 
90* (refer to Figure 22A). Consider the case when the beam has just reached the obstacle 
(i. e. point R in contact with the base of the obstacle). As the vehicle moves forward 1. 0 
meters (Figure 22B) the maximum range decrease will be about 1. 1,meters and the system 
will indicate a hazard. 
The foregoing analysis shows that for a vehicle traversing a flat terrain, discern­
ment between all negotiable positive slopes and non-negotiable positive obstacles or slopes 
can be made with proper implementation of threshold logic. 
A. 2 	 ERRORS IN SURFACE HAZARD DETECTION 
Errors in range readings will be due to pitch error, roll error, terrain random 
roughness (power spectral density), terrain random slope angle and inherent radar errors. 
The following section discusses each of these sources of error in detail and then summarizes 
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the combined effect they would present to a surface hazard detection system. Inherent radar 
errors are discussed in section 5 and the results from that analysis are also included in the 
final summation of errors. 
A. 2. 1 Vehicle Pitch and Roll 
Erroneous range indications will be produced when the beam depression angle, 
with respect to the horizontal (450) varies, due either to vehicle pitch, pitching of the mast 
structure, or both. For example, if the depression angle increases by 1. 50 from 450 to 
46. 50, the slant range will decrease by 3 3 _ or+ 0 meters.
sin4450 - sin46. 50 or + 1 ees 
It is shown in section A. 3 that in order to insure a reasonably high detection prob­
ability the total system errors must be less than . 125 meters. Since pitch error is only one 
of a number of errors expected, an error of . 10 meters would be unacceptably high. In 
order to assure a reasonable budget for the pitch error, compensation (using appropriate 
range bias voltages) must be provided for this pitch variation so that the effective variation 
.in depression angle is less than .750 This would keep the maximum slant range error due 
to pitch change less than +. 0507 meters. The RMS error would then be given by 
2 x .0507 
=0288 meters.2 l 
Similarly, range reading errors will be produced when the vehicle rolls and causes 
the six transmit antennas to roll with it. The largest errors will be produced in the extreme 
antennas, Nos. 1 and 6, (see Figure 3). For example, assuming antenna No. 6 is 0.8 meters 
from the vehicle center line then the slant range error (to a first order) due to a roll of 
2.50 is 0.8 x sin 2.50 .05 meters. Thus, if the roll is compensated to within 2.50 about
sin 450 
its reference, or horizontal plane value, then the expected or RMS error would then be given 
2x 05 y 2,/=3.028 meters. 
A. 2.2 Errors Due to Lunar Terrain 
Reference 28 includes a description of the different types of lunar terrain. Heter­
ogeneity of the lunar surface virtually precludes a complete numerical description of all types 
of terrain that might be encountered by a lunar roving vehicle. The only meaningful alter­
native is a sanipling of representative lunar terrain types or classes. Thus far, the avail­
ability of large scale terrain data has limited the number of lunar terrain classes to four: 
smooth mare, rough mare, hummocky upland, and rough upland. Table 1, which has been 
extracted from reference 28, shows the topographic features typically included in each cate­
gory. The following is concerned with parameters such as the mean slope values and the 
power spectral density of the terrain and their effect on range reading. 
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TABLE 1 FOUR-PART CLASSIFICATION OF LUNAR TERRAIN 
MARE 
Smoother Mare Rougher Mare Hummocky Upland Rough Upland 
(1) many Eastern 
sites 
(1) many Western 
sites 
(1) older vasin rim 
material (Fra 
Mauro fin) 
(1) younger basin rim 
(2) dark mare 
material 
(2) rile, dome & 
ridge areas 
(2) older large 
craters 
(2) younger large 
craters 
(3) older, subdued 
craters 
(3) fresh craters (3) blanketed era-
ters 
(3) scarps 
(4) 	 low crater den- (4) high crater (4) older, subdued (4) fresh crater hash 
sities densities crater hash 
(5) 	 craters with (5) blocky cra- (5) outer rim slopes (5) inner rim slopes of 
few blocks ters of large craters large craters 
(6) 	 secondary (6) crater floors & (6) trenches & rifts 
swarms es- basin fill 
pecially on 
rays
 
(7) 	 large crater 
rims 
A. 2.2.1 The Power Spectral Density. (PSD) 
The Power Spectral Density (PSD) expresses the relief frequency content of a ter­
rain profile as a time series. Like slope curvature it is a measure of relative terrain 
roughness, and can be somewhat independent of absolute slope angle and regional slopes. 
Reference 28 expresses this measure as afull logarithmic graph of power spectral density, in 
meters 2 /cycle/meter, against frequency, in cycles/meter. Two curves, representing , 
roughest and smoothest terrain conditions within each of the four main lunar terrain types, 
are presented. The following is an attempt, using simple assumptions, to ascertain range 
reading error produced by this type of terrain roughness. For the smooth mare, two 
curves bracket most terrain types encountered in this type of mare. 
At a frequency of one cycle per meter, (this is a convenient frequency for the 
hazard detection study since it is concerned with measuring change of range in an interval-of 
one meter of vehicle travel) .0004 is taken as the average PSD between the curves. 
For simplicity, the terrain height variation is represented by a sine wave whose 
rms value isv. 0004 or . 02 meters. Assuming then that the vehicle's vertical excursions 
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(and, therefore, the antenna) will have an rms value of .02 meters, and similarly, that the 
terrain illuminated will have an rms vertical excursion of .02 meters, then the vertical 
component of the slant range will have an rms value of . 022 + . 022 or .028 meters. (This 
of course assumes statistical independence between the terrain illuminated and the terrain 
under the wheels). From this an EMS value (noise amplitude) or error in slant range read­
ing is calculated to be: 
.028 .028 
sin (depression angle) sin (450) 
or . 04 meters per meter of vehicle travel due to terrain power spectral density on the smooth 
mare. 
For the rough mare the same procedure is followed. At a frequency of one cycle 
per meter a PSD of .0009 is taken as an average value between the two curves, then, con­
tinuing as before, the error in slant range will be . 06 meters per meter of vehicle travel. 
For the hummocky upland .0005 is taken to be the value of the PSD. The slant 
range error is then .044 meters per meter of travel. 
For the rough upland, .0009 is taken for the PSD. The slant range error 'is then 
. 06 meters per meter of vehicle travel. 
A.2.2.2 The SlopeAngle 
Measuring the departure of topography from the horizontal, slope angle is an 
absolute index of terrain roughness. Slope angles measured along a profile may be expressed 
either as absolute values or algebraic values, where slopes facing, for example, east are 
designated positive, and west-facing slopes negative. Since comparatively little is to be 
gained from using algebraic slopes, the slope angle data given here is expressed in absolute 
values. Reference 28 gives the predicted distributions of one meter slopes for four lunar 
terrain types whose mean slope values are known or estimated. Referring to the smooth 
mare, the mean slope for one meter base length is 2.90. This represents a height change of 
.051 meters in a one meter base length. The RMS height change will be * 051 03 meters 
4=. 0425 meters. 
above or below the level ground, and the slant range error will be 
For the rough mare the mean slope value is 5.30 per meter of base length, and the slant 
range error will be .077 meters. For the hummocky upland the mean slope value is 8.20 
per meter of base length, and the slant range error will be . 12 meters, and for the rough 
upland the mean slope value is 1i. 00 and the slant range error will be . 16 meters. 
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A. 2.3 Summary of Errors 
The errors in range readings will be due to pitch error, roll error, terrain 
random roughness (power spectral density) terrain random slope angle, and inherent radar 
errors. For the purpose of simplicity, the composite- RMS error of any one range measure­
ment will be taken as the root mean square of the component errors. The overall REVIS error 
(1 a error) of a range difference measurement will be the composite RMS error multiplied by 
thev'2since the difference measurement consists of two independent slant range readings. 
The following is a listing of the errors 
Pitch Error .029 meters 
Roll Error .028 meters 
Radar Inherent 
Error (sect. 5) .053 meters 
PSD Slope7 Angle 
(meters) (meters) 
Smooth Mare Terrain Errors .04 . 0425 
Rough Mare Terrain Errors .06 . 077 
Hummocky Upland Terrain Errors .044 .12 
Rough Upland Terrain Errors .06 .16 
Smooth Mare Total Errors 
Composite RMS Error V 0 2 92 + .0282 + 0532 + .042 + .04252 =.088 meters
 
Overall RMS Error = .088-= .125 meters
 
Rough Mare Total Errors 
Composite RMS Error =/0292 + .0282 +. 053 + .062 + .0772=. 118 meters
 
Overall RMS Error = 118,7z2. 165 meters
 
Hummocky Upland Total Errors 
Composite EMS Errors = 0292 + .0282 + .0532 + .0442 +.122 =.143 meters
 
Overall RMS Error --.1432-- . 202 Meters
 
Rough Upland Total Errors 
Composite RMS Errors =1/0292 + .0282 + .0532+. 062 + .162 =.183 meters
 
Overall RMS Errors =. 183 -= .258 meters
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A. 3 DETECTION PROBABILITY AND FALSE ALARM RATE
 
It is clear that the problem of range measurement errors will lead to false alarms 
and a detection probability that is less than 100%. The most important criterion is the prob­
ability of detecting the hazard, and this, will have to be as high as possible. 
In the following analysis a detection probability, for a particular terrain, is 
assumed and the distribution of errors are assumed to b6 gausian. Next the probability of 
false alarms for the various hazards, are evaluated using the previously computed RMS 
errors. A false alarm is defined as the case when the radar reports a negotiable slope, 
hole, or obstacle to be hazardous. The gausian distribution chart of reference 5 has been 
utilized in the analysis. 
A. 3. 1 The Positive Slope and Obstacle 
It was indicated in section A-i that the logic circuitry, for the positive slope case, 
will measure the range differences between the first and seven subsequent readings, covering 
a travel distAnce of 1. 75 meters. For a slope angle of 350, the computed range difference is 
1. 02 meters over this interval. As a starting point, a detection probability of 98% is assumed, 
for positive slope angles of 350 on smooth mare terrain. Since the overall RMS error (1a 
value) for the smooth mare is .125 meters, then for 98% detection probability the threshold 
is set at 2oa below 1. 02, or .77 meters. Of course the false alarm rate will be relatively 
high'. For example a positive slope of 20' (which produces a range difference reading of 
.66 meters, or .88 a below the threshold setting) will have a detectionprobability, or in 
this case, false alarm rate of about 20%. Slopes larger than this, will of course have higher 
false alarm rates. 
Obstacles are basically in the same category as slopes and will be governed by the 
same logic. One meter height obstacles will register a range difference of 1. 1 meters in 
the first 1. 0 meter of travel and therefore have a probability of detection of about 99. 5%. 
On the other hand 1/2 meter height obstacles, (which do not constitute hazards) will give a 
maximum range difference of about 0. 68 meters (or . 72 a below the threshold reading) and 
will therefore have a false alarm rate of 24%. Larger blocks will of course have higher 
false alarm rates. 
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A. 3.2 The Negative Slope and Obstacle 
It was indicated in section A-i that the logic circuitry, for the negative slope case, 
will measure the range difference between the first and two subsequent readings, covering a 
total travel distance of 0.5 meters. As a starting point, a detection probability of 98% for 
1 meter holes on smooth mare terrain is assumed. A one meter hole will produce a range 
increase of 1. 1 meters in the first 0. 50 meters of travel. Thus for 98% detection probabil­
ity the threshold is set at 2 abelow 1. 1 meters or .850 meters. Half meter deep, by 1 meter 
long holes will give a change of 0. 7 meters in 0. 5 meters of travel and therefore have a 
false alarm rate of 11%. As mentioned previously, 350 negative slopes (which do not 
constitute hazards) will not be detected due to weak-signal returns and therefore will be 
recorded as hazards. Furthermore, 25' slopes, which give a range increase of .615 meters 
in an interval of 0. 5 meters of travel will have a false alarm rate of 2.5%. 
The same calculations have been carried out for positive and negative obstacles 
occurring in the rough mare, hummocky upland and rough upland. The r~sults for the four 
lunar surface categories are summarized in Table 2. 
A. 3.3 The Change of Slope 
Additional detection problems will arise when the terrain changes slope angle, from 
one angle to another. For example, consider Figures 23 & 24 where 4 illustrative cases are 
shown. 
Case A 
In this case the vehicle is on a 200 positive slope and is approaching a 15T positive 
slope with respect to the given slope. Stated otherwise, it is approaching a 350 positive 
slope, (with respect to level terrain) which constitutes a hazard. However, the radar sees 
only a 15' slope. In the discussion, concerning positive slopes, (section A-i) it was stated 
that when the range difference exceeds the threhold value of .77 meters in 1.75 meters of 
travel (positive slope logic) then the system-will indicate a hazard. A 150 slope represents 
175xsin (15 0 
a rangeachangechagerane ofofonlyonly sinsin(60(e ) or .495 meters in 1.75 meters of travel. Thus, 
it will have only a 1. 5%probability of being detected, assuming a 1 u range error of . 125 
meters (smooth mare). It is evident, therefore that the threshold value will have to be 
varied in accordance with the particular slope that the vehicle is on at the moment. For 
example, for this case, if the threshold were effectively changed to . 370 meters by adding" 
a range decrease bias of .400 meters the probability of detecting the 150 'slope would be 
increased to 84%. Referring to Table 2, this value is equivalent to the probability of 
detecting a 350 positive slope when approached from a flat terrain in the rough uplands. 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF DETECTION PROBABILITIES AND FALSE ALARM RATES 
Smooth Mare Rough Mare Hummocky Upland Rough Upland 
False False False False 
Detect. Alarm Detect. Alarm Detect. Alarm Detect. Alarm 
Prob. Rate Prob. Rate Prob. Rate Prob. Rate 
1 meter block 99.5% 98% 95% 91%
 
1/2 meter block 24% 30% 32% 37%
 
350 pos slope 98% 93% 90% 84%
 
200 pos slope 20% 25% 30% 34%
 
I meter hole 98% 93% 90% 84%
 
1/2 meter hole 11% 19% 24% 28%
 
350 neg slope 100% "100% 100% 100%
 
25 neg slope 2.5% 7% 11% 17%
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Figure 23. Vehicle Approaching Change of Slope 
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Case B 
In this case the vehicle is on a 200 positive slope and is approaching a 250 negative 
slope with respect to the given slope (50 slope with respect to the level terrain and therefore 
non hazardous). Two factors are in operation now. Since the vehicle is on a positive slope 
the threshold value will have changed by . 400 meters in the negative direction (due to range 
decrease). On the other hand, since the radar is tracking a negative slope, negative slope 
logic will be in operation. In the discussion concerning negative slopes it was stated that 
when the range increase exceeds the threshold of .85 meters per 1/2 meter of travel or less, 
the system will indicate a hazard. A 250 negative slope represents a range increase of 0.Sx sin 250sin 20 or . 615 meters per 1/2 meter of travel. Since the threshold has been changedsin 200 
by .400 meters in the negative direction, the effective range increase is . 615 - .400 or 
.215 meters. Therefore its false alarm rate is less than 0.1%. Referring to Table 2, this 
value is much less than the false alarm rate caused by 250 negative slopes when approached 
from a flat terrain in all types of lunar terrain. 
Case C 
In this case the vehicle is on a 200 negative slope and is approaching a 150 negative 
slope with -respect to the given slope (350 negative slope with respect to level terrain and 
therefore a hazard). However, the radar sees only a 150 negative slope. A 150 negativesin -150 
slope represents a range increase of 0. 5 x sin 300 or .253 meters per 1/2 meter of travel. 
Thus, it will have less than a 1% chance of being detected, assuming the threshold is at 
.85 meters (negative slope logic). Therefore, as in Case A, the threshold will have to be 
varied. In this case, if the threshold were effectively changed to .253 meters by adding a 
range increase bias of . 597 meters the detection probability would increase to 50%. Refer­
ring to Table 2, this value exceeds the probability of detecting 350 negative slopes when ap­
proached from a flat terrain in all types of lunar terrain. 
Case D 
In this case the vehicle is on a 209 negative slope and is approaching a positive 350 
slope. (150 positive slope with respect to level terrain and therefore non hazardous). As in 
Case B, two factors are now in operation. Since the vehicle is on a negative slope (Case C 
above) the threshold will have changed by . 597 meters in the positive direction (due to range 
increase). On the other hand, since the radar is tracking a positive slope, positive slope 
logic will be in operation. As mentioned in Case A, the positive slope logic is such that 
when the range decrease exceeds the threshold value of . 77 meters per 1. 75 meters of 
travel or less the system will indicate a hazard. A 350 positive slope represents a range 
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decrease of 75x 0 or 1.02 meters per 1. 75 meters of travel. Since the thresholdsinl S00has been changed by. 597 meters in the positive direction, the effective range decrease is 
1.02 - .597 or .423 meters. Therefore its false alarm rate -is less than 1%. Referring to 
Table 2, this value is much less than the false alarm rate caused by 200 positive slopes when 
approached from a flat terrain in all types of lunar terrain. 
The foregoing analysis serves to show that changing slopes in the lunar terrain 
present a serious problem to an automatic hazard detection system. Automatic adjustment 
of threshold biasing must be incorporated into the system so that detection probability and 
false alarm rates can be maintained at acceptable levels. Signals to initiate changes in 
threshold bias must be provided by accurate and reliable attitude sensors. 
A-18
 
GRUMMAN zNOWE7 W r BETHPAGE. NEW YORK 11714 
